

Dear Dan -  
FYI -  
(I'd be interested  
in your reactions  
not that that's source - a is there?)  
new from him - love - a is there?  
MB-6

1/10/89 Draft

(Dillon)  
This looks like  
"Atlantic"  
(will probably  
be an  
Atlantic  
monthly?)

Can We End The Cold War? Should We Try?  
by Robert S. McNamara

The Cold War between East and West -- a continuing series of political crises, any one of which had the potential for escalating to military confrontation carrying the risk of destruction of our civilization -- has existed for over forty years.

It has led to huge US expenditures for defense -- over two trillion dollars in the past eight years; it has turned our attention away from urgent domestic problems; it has distorted our relations with other nations; and it has moved us away from our traditional values.

In recent months, General Secretary Gorbachev's public statements have confirmed that the costs to the Soviet Union have been at least as great. On several different occasions he has shown a desire to end the conflict. He has stated that war between the Super Powers is no longer an acceptable instrument of political change and he says "today's problems between East and West must be resolved solely through political means."

Is a world without risk of war between East and West an idle dream, an unrealistic hope? Many -- probably most -- students of history and geo-politics would claim that it is.

But is such a thought any more inconceivable than:

- . Jean Monet's vision of a United Europe.
- . Sadat's initiative to bring peace to Egypt and Israel.
- . Adenauer and DeGaulle's determination to ensure peaceful relations between France and Germany after hundreds of years of war.

- . The dramatic shift in US-Japan relations after World War II.
- . The termination of the hostile relationship between the US and China.

Can we visualize a world without the Cold War? What shape would it take? What steps would lead to it? Can we move in that direction without incurring unacceptable risks in the event we fail?

These are questions I will pursue in this article. In the course of doing so I will:

- . Summarize the dramatic shift, in recent years, in the attitudes of the Soviet leaders toward continued conflict with the West, and reflect on the causes and consequences of the change.
- . Review the Western response to the Soviet initiatives and propose a far more radical set of moves in both the political and military spheres.
- . Recognize and discuss potential criticisms of the proposed program.

I will conclude that we do indeed face an opportunity -- the greatest in forty years -- to bring an end to the Cold War. To fail to grasp it means an indefinite extension of the risk that unintended conflict between East and West will endanger the very survival of our civilization.

## II. Gorbachev's Changes in Soviet Foreign Policy: Their Causes and Objectives

It is clear that Mikhail Gorbachev is attempting to introduce major transformations into both Soviet domestic policy and Soviet foreign policy. Among the myriad of changes introduced at his initiative are at least four that bear directly on East-West relations:



- . A nation's security interests should be pursued through diplomacy not military threats or the use of force.
- . One nation's security cannot be guaranteed at the expense of the security of others. Security cannot be pursued unilaterally; it must be strengthened in cooperation with other states.
- . International organizations and bilateral efforts can serve to solve regional and global problems.

Gorbachev has consistently repeated each of these themes in a number of speeches, articles, and press conferences since 1985.

The point that Gorbachev returns to more than any other when discussing foreign policy is his belief that modern military technologies, specifically nuclear weapons, have rendered war an inadmissible means of advancing a nation's security interests. There is a lack of proportionality in nuclear war, according to Gorbachev: the destruction would far outweigh any conceivable political goal. And any war between the US and the Soviet Union contains within it the seeds of a possible unlimited nuclear war.

He has said, for example, "Our awareness of the realities of the present day world has led us to the recognition that it is no longer possible to settle international disputes by force of arms. We have arrived at a conclusion which is of historic importance: a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. One inexorable conclusion follows: There is no need for weapons [he is referring to the 50,000 nuclear warheads possessed by the US and USSR] which cannot be used without destroying ourselves and indeed all of mankind."

*threatened?  
risked?  
(needed, for  
these?  
process of  
acquisition  
strengthens "bluff"?)*

What is the origin of the "New Thinking?" Is it a passing phase?

I believe that two forces have led to the fundamental change in, at least, the Soviet's stated views of its relationship with the West.

The first is that country's economic crisis.

It is far more severe than many of us in the West recognized. The GNP growth rate, reported at 6% per annum in the 1960's, 4% per annum in the 70's, and 2% per annum in the early 80's, has been stagnant for several years.

The effects of the stagnant economy have been reflected in basic measures of social welfare: life expectancy has fallen; infant mortality has risen; alcoholism has increased; and the Soviet press has reported that the quantity of food available to the average Soviet citizen is less today than under the Czars in 1915.

Gorbachev is aware of these conditions. In "Perestroika," he speaks of a society in crisis. He recognizes that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to finance the investment required to



to expand productivity and make the Soviet Union into a strong competitor in the global market in the twenty-first century, without reducing the inordinately high level of defense expenditures.

In contrast to the 6% or 7% of GNP which the US devotes to defense, the Soviets are spending a minimum of 17% and perhaps as much as 23% or 24%. They are an example of a Great Power -- as is implied in Paul Kennedy's book "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers" -- in which economic strength and security expenditures are out of balance. To strengthen the economy, defense outlays in relation to GNP must be reduced. But to do so, without reducing security, requires a reduction in the political conflict between East and West and a start on winding down the arms race. *for SU?*

At the same time that domestic economic problems are pushing Gorbachev to search for ways to reduce East-West conflict, he has come to recognize the increasing danger of military action in the nuclear age. The Soviets have studied the origin and implications of the confrontations over Berlin, Cuba, and the Middle-East. They have recognized, perhaps more than the Western world, the great danger that through misinformation, misjudgment, and miscalculation, such crises may escalate. Their sensitivity to such risks was evident at a meeting I attended in Cambridge, Massachusetts in October 1987.

Harvard University had invited McGeorge Bundy and Ted Sorensen, two close associates of President Kennedy, and me to join three Soviet officials -- Fyodor Burlatsky, Khrushchev's personal

assistant and now an advisor to Gorbachev; Sergo Mikoyan, the son of the influential Politburo member; and Georgi Shakhnazarov, a senior member of the Central Committee staff -- to discuss the causes of the Cuban missile crisis, and the lessons to be learned from that event.

In 1962, the Soviet Union, under the cloak of secrecy, and with the clear intent to deceive, had introduced intermediate-range nuclear missiles into Cuba. A series of actions followed which brought the US and the Soviet Union to the verge of military conflict and the world to the brink of nuclear disaster.

At the Harvard meeting, the Soviets stated with extraordinary candor that Khrushchev had acted in a spirit of adventurism and without consideration of the consequences. But Khrushchev did what he did, and Kennedy responded as he did, because each leader, their associates, and their peoples were captives of gross misperceptions and deep-seated mistrust -- misperceptions and mistrust that exist to this day.

After 15 hours of private exchanges and a full day of public discussion, Mikoyan stated he was only then beginning to believe that in 1962 the US did not intend to invade Cuba and destroy the Castro government. And yet, I can say, without qualification, we had absolutely no such intent. We were equally wrong in our perceptions of Soviet behavior and objectives.

The result was that on Saturday, October 27, 1962 the crisis had reached such a point that Burlatsky reported to us he and a Central Committee colleague decided to move their wives and children to the

\* e.g.: did we not foreseeably contribute to the belief?

Start?  
JFK's;  
Mongols;  
Cuba I;  
Russia  
threats  
(Boris...)

5-27"

? e.g.?

LIE

countryside in anticipation of a US nuclear strike on Moscow. And, at the same time in Washington, on a beautiful Fall evening, as I left the President's office to return to the Pentagon, I thought I might never live to see another Saturday night. I know this sounds melodramatic, but it reflects the state of mind of the participants on both sides at that critical moment in the crisis.

What were the lessons learned?

We agreed there were two.

1. In this nuclear age crisis management is dangerous, difficult, uncertain. It is not possible to predict with confidence the consequences of military action between the Superpowers and their allies because of misjudgment, misinformation, miscalculation.
2. Therefore, we must direct our attention to crisis avoidance. And that means reducing political tensions between East and West by striking at the misperceptions and mistrust that underlie such tensions.

from Cuba II?

" ? "

In the twenty-six years that have passed since the Missile Crisis, we have made little progress in that direction. But I believe today we face an unparalleled opportunity to probe -- and I use the verb "probe" intentionally -- the extent to which major steps can be taken to shrink dramatically the basis for East-West conflict.

VN  
Czech.  
Afghan  
Bosnia  
Lithuania  
MIRV...

### III. Western Responses to the Soviet Initiatives: Past and Prospective

Western reactions, particularly those of the US, to Gorbachev's proposals for changes in East-West political and military relations -- changes so dramatic, so revolutionary as to literally

consider  
what  
Pres was  
rejecting -  
"vision-  
conceivable"  
- as  
solution.  
(While Castro  
was pressing for  
action - assumption  
invasion was  
imminent!)  
("we attack"?)



imply a desire to end the Cold War -- have been skeptical, unimaginative, and very cautious.

Perhaps at this stage, only 48 months after Gorbachev came on the scene, that is to be expected. For forty years US foreign policy and defense programs have been shaped largely by one major <sup>national</sup> force: fear of, and opposition to, the spread of Soviet-sponsored communism. It will require a leap of the imagination for us to conceive of our national goals -- our role -- in a world not dominated by the struggle between East and West. as in Nic?  
Don Rob?

In the immediate post-war years, Americans viewed the world as composed of: a group of Western nations devastated by war; colonial nations in Africa and Asia straining for freedom; developing countries elsewhere struggling to advance; and all endangered by the two great Communist powers -- China and the Soviet Union -- whom we saw as determined to extend their hegemony across the globe. Ha

He In such a world the US viewed itself as: a generous benefactor of the poor; a source of aid to the nations seeking to recover from the war; the protector of freedom and democracy everywhere; and the defender of all against the Communist threat. Fearing that threat, the US: developed a massive military force; forged alliances with nations of both North and South; and supplied economic and military assistance to <sup>and to...</sup> democratic regimes across the globe.

The opposition between East and West has continued to dominate the world political scene. Neither national policies nor international institutions have yet adjusted to the possibility of a

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termination of the Cold War. And neither national nor international leaders have yet conceived of the shape of the world that would result, or of how to catalyze movement toward it. The world of today is still organized to reflect the rivalry -- indeed the enmity -- between the Socialist and Capitalist camps.

Before we can respond to Gorbachev, we need a vision of a world which would not be dominated by that enmity. It would not be a world without conflict, conflict between disparate groups within nations and conflict extending across national borders. Racial and ethnic differences will remain. Political revolutions will erupt as societies advance. Historical disputes over political boundaries will continue. Economic differentials among nations, as the technological revolution of the 21st Century spreads unevenly across the globe, will increase.

In those respects the world of the future will not be different from the world of the past -- conflicts within and between nations will not disappear. But how different that world would be if the Superpowers agreed that:

a) neither would seek to take advantage of such disputes to increase or extend their political or military power beyond their borders;

and b) their bilateral relations would be conducted according to rules of conduct which precluded the use of force.

No leader of East or West, and no scholar so far as I know, has sketched out how the nations of East and West and North and South might

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relate to each other in such a world or how they could move toward it through a series of steps extending over a decade or more. I will try to do so dealing first with political actions and later with changes in military forces.

It is clear that in the 21st Century regardless of actions by the Soviet Union and the US, relations among nations will differ dramatically from those of the post-war decades. In the post-war years the US had the power -- and to a considerable degree we exercised it -- to shape the world as we chose. In the next century, whether or not the Cold War ends, that will not be possible. While remaining the world's strongest nation, we will live in a multi-polar world and our foreign policy and defense programs must be adjusted to that reality.

We have already seen the rise of Japan. We must expect it to play a larger and larger role -- exercising greater political power and assuming greater political and economic responsibility -- on the world scene. The same can be said of Western Europe, which will take a giant step toward economic integration in 1992. From that is bound to follow greater political unity which will strengthen Europe's power in world politics.

And by the middle of the next century several of the countries, of what we now think of as the Third World, will have so increased in size and economic power as to be major participants in decisions affecting relations among nations. India will have a population in excess of 1.5 billion, Nigeria 500 million, and Brazil 300 million. If China achieves its economic goals for the year 2000,



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and if it moves forward during the next fifty years at satisfactory but not spectacular growth rates, the income per capita of its approximately 1.5 billion people in 2050 will be roughly equal to that of the British in 1965. Its total Gross National Product will exceed by far that of either the US, Western Europe, Japan, or the USSR. These figures are, of course, highly speculative. I point to them simply to emphasize the magnitude of the changes which lie ahead and the need to begin now to adjust our goals, our policies and our institutions to take account of them.

In such a multi-polar world, neither the US nor the USSR would be able to so completely dominate their respective spheres as at present. Nor would the advantages outweigh the costs, even if it were possible. With or without changes in relations between East and West, the US must prepare to reposition itself, politically, for a new role in a new world -- a world which our children, living today, will not be able to avoid.

There, clearly, is need for developing a new relationship both between East and West and between "the North" and the Third World.

At a minimum, such a relationship should:

1. Guarantee the military neutrality of the Third World.
2. Commit the Super Powers to sharp reductions in, and ultimately termination of, military support of conflicts between Third World nations and conflicts between opposition political parties within those nations.
3. Assure support for a system of collective security for the nations of the South, and a mechanism for resolution of Regional Conflicts without Super Power involvement.

*See  
prolif.?*

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4. Provide assistance to the developing countries to help them accelerate their rates of social and economic advance.

Agreement by East and West to support such a program would not only represent adjustment to the reality of economic and political change in the Third World, but would be consistent with moves to dampen down and ultimately terminate the Cold War. It would be a return to Roosevelt's and Churchill's conception of the post-war world, a conception, which, when first formulated in the Atlantic Charter in 1941 and later expanded into a proposal for establishment of the UN, was uncontaminated by the ideology of the Cold War.

To implement the Charter and to maintain post-war order, Roosevelt was increasingly attracted to the concept of an international organization. Roosevelt reasoned that, in the past, American isolation and neutrality had failed to keep the peace. With no faith, therefore, in isolation, neutrality, or balance-of-power arrangements, he saw no alternative to international cooperation.

Roosevelt's hopes for a strong, united organization that would defend a single interpretation of the post-war order were, of course, not to be fulfilled. By the time the UN was organized, East-West rivalry rendered it impotent.

But is it not time to return to Roosevelt's conception of a world in which order would be maintained through international cooperation and support for a set of multilateral institutions -- the United Nations and regional organizations? To move toward realization

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of Roosevelt's vision, should not East and West agree on a Code of Conduct to cover relations between themselves and between them and other nations. Such a Code could provide that:

1. Each Bloc's political interests will be pursued through diplomacy, not military threats or the use of force.
2. Consistent with 1, each Bloc's military forces will be restructured to defensive postures and reduced to a balance at substantially lower levels.
3. The Super Powers will not become involved in Regional Conflicts.
4. The nations of East and West, and in particular the Super Powers, will utilize international organizations to solve regional and global problems, including conflicts within and between Third World nations.

CA?

The Code of Conduct would have precluded such unilateral post-war actions as:

- Soviet intervention in: Afghanistan; Angola (via the Cubans); Indo-China (via the North Vietnamese); and Korea (via the North Koreans).
- US intervention in: Vietnam; the Dominican Republic; Nicaragua; Grenada; and the Persian Gulf. *Angola ?! Korea ?!*
- British and French intervention in Egypt.

While steps are being taken to reduce the danger of East-West political conflict, the arms control negotiations now underway should be expanded in scope and accelerated in time.

The short-term arms negotiation agenda should stress: early completion of the START Treaty; rapid progress toward the restructuring and balancing of conventional forces in Europe; and, in association with the conventional force adjustments, large reductions in tactical nuclear forces.

*(NFU? or not ?!)*  
*mid-term)*



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The "short-term" program will greatly improve crisis stability. However, after it is completed, NATO and the Warsaw Pact will retain thousands of nuclear warheads and NATO's strategy will continue to be based on first-use of these weapons under certain circumstances. The danger of nuclear war -- the risk of destruction of our society -- will have been reduced but not eliminated. Can we go further? Surely the answer must be Yes.

More and more political and military leaders are accepting that major changes in NATO's nuclear strategy are required. Some are going so far as to state that our long-term objective should be to return, insofar as practical, to a non-nuclear world.

McN?

If it were decided to move away from nuclear deterrence, how would this be done?

Mikhail Gorbachev has proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union aim at achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. But the genie is out of the bottle -- we cannot remove from men's minds the knowledge of how to build nuclear warheads. Therefore, unless technologies and procedures can be developed to ensure detection of any steps toward building a single nuclear bomb by any nation or terrorist group -- and such safeguards are not on the horizon -- an agreement for total nuclear disarmament will almost certainly degenerate into an unstable rearmament race.

Thus, despite the desirability of a world without nuclear weapons, an agreement to that end does not appear feasible either today or for the foreseeable future.

However, if NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the other nuclear powers were to agree, in principle, that each nation's nuclear force would be no larger than was needed to deter <sup>use of a force derived by cheating</sup> cheating -- secretly building nuclear weapons -- how large might such a force be? Policing an arms agreement that restricted each side to a small number of warheads is quite feasible with present verification technology. The number of warheads required for a force sufficiently large to deter cheating would be determined by the number any nation could build without detection. I know of no studies which point to what that number might be -- they should be initiated -- but surely it would not exceed a few hundred, say at most five hundred. Very possibly it would be far less, perhaps in the tens.

Such an agreement could be achieved only over a period of years, -- say by the year 2000 -- but should we not set it as our ultimate objective and lay out a series of steps to move toward it. As we move in that direction and complete as well Gorbachev's plan for restructuring and reducing conventional forces, the US defense budget could be reduced substantially. It might well be possible to cut military expenditures in half in relation to GNP, i.e. to 3%. That would make available, in 1989 dollars and in relation to 1989 GNP, \$150 billion per year to be divided between human and physical infrastructure needs of both our own and Third World Societies.

#### IV. Potential Criticisms of a Program Which Has As Its Stated Objective Ending the Cold War

After forty years, an attempt to shift relationships between East and West, as dramatically as is implied by a Program to End the

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Cold War, is by its very nature uncertain of accomplishment, potentially risky, and likely to be highly controversial.

Among the criticisms which might be directed against it are the following:

1. A respite in the Cold War will strengthen the Soviet Union and they will use their increased strength to weaken the West.
2. To date, with the exception of Gorbachev's December 7, 1988 proposal, there is little evidence of major changes in Soviet military deployments, and no apparent shift in military doctrine or reduction in defense budgets.
3. Moves to terminate the Cold War will undermine support both in Europe and the US for defenses sufficient to provide security during the negotiating process.
4. There will always be conflicts of interest -- political, economic, military as well as ideological -- between nations and especially between Great Powers, which cannot be resolved by good will alone. Therefore, while the US should welcome and encourage any sign of liberalization in the Soviet Union, it should never confuse such changes with a Soviet abandonment of basic foreign policy aims. It is naive to think otherwise.



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5. Past experience indicates the Soviets will not adhere to agreements to reduce political tensions or to limit arms. At times advantageous to them, they will attempt to "break out" of such agreements. Their ability to do so is greater than ours because of the nature of their political system.
6. Gorbachev is likely to fail. If he fails, his successor will reverse Gorbachev's policies, placing a complacent West in a position of inferiority.

Each of these criticisms is worthy of consideration, but each can be rebutted.

- . Were the Soviet Union to strengthen its domestic economy it might indeed direct that strength against the West. However, it will be years, perhaps even decades, before Perestroika begins to yield significant economic benefits. The reforms will bring huge disruptions of production and people. Gorbachev himself has said the reform process will take a generation. In the intervening period the relative economic strength of the West is bound to increase. Moreover, achievement of Perestroika will require that the USSR be integrated into global markets and international scientific exchanges.

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The integrating process itself will contribute to a lowering of political tensions between East and West and will tend to make the changes irreversible.

- . It is correct to say that with the exception of Gorbachev's December 7 proposal, there has been little change in Soviet military doctrine or defense budgets. The concepts Gorbachev has put forward ("reasonable sufficiency," "defensive posture," and "asymmetrical reductions") are new to the East as well as to the West. While eminently sound, they are difficult to translate into particulars, so difficult that neither the US nor NATO has been able to respond to Gorbachev's general proposals with a bill of particulars as to how they should be implemented. Until we do so, criticism of his inaction is hardly justified.

- . Maintaining public support in the US and Europe for appropriate defense budgets will be difficult in any event. The requirement to reduce the US fiscal deficit will lead to proposals to cut defense expenditures in real terms. These pressures will, in turn, lead to suggestions that Europe and Japan shoulder a larger part of our common defense burden. This they are unlikely to do in any way that would permit a significant cut in the

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US defense budget. So public support for defense expenditures will erode. But I believe it will erode less rapidly if we appear to be trying to maintain a strong, stable defense posture as a foundation for moving in a constructive way to probe the degree to which we can reduce political tension between East and West.

US! . Many historians will assert that Great Powers -- and regardless of the success of Perestroika, the Soviet Union will clearly remain a Great Power -- always have had and always will have an external enemy; they need such a target both to justify their military force and to maintain the power of the internal ruling class. History tends to support that judgment. But as I have pointed out, the world of the 21st Century will be different from that of any other period since the dawn of civilization. For the first time, no nation and no group of nations will be able to stand alone economically, technologically, environmentally, politically or militarily. Attempts by the Soviet Union to do so would not only endanger international peace and carry great risks for the USSR, but would be doomed to failure in the long run. Therefore, our objective should be to remain so secure as to make an



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effort by any nation, to move away from interdependence toward domination, so costly as to be unattractive.

It is probably correct to say that the majority of US Soviet experts believe Gorbachev will fail. Marshall Goldman expressed this sentiment a few months ago in an article in the New York Times. As Goldman pointed out, at least some Soviet officials share that view. Sakharov, for example, was quoted in the Washington Post of November 8, 1988 as saying "Perestroika is at a very sharp, acute phase." However, while noting the difficulties Gorbachev faces, we should be aware that there is mounting evidence the top Soviet political leadership, and the majority of the Soviet intelligensia, recognize he has diagnosed properly the basic problems faced by their society. They understand there is no alternative to his political and economic reforms if long-term economic crises and resultant political disorders are to be avoided. If Gorbachev's efforts fail -- and they may -- his successor will face the same problems. To solve them he will be required ultimately to introduce the same solution. There may be steps forward and steps back, but for the next decade or two, it is likely the Soviet Union will move in the broad direction laid down by the General Secretary.

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In sum, there is justification for the potential criticisms -- of attempts to dampen down and ultimately to terminate the Cold War. Even under the best of circumstances the way will not be smooth and progress may indeed be slow and interrupted. Can we protect ourselves against an even less desirable outcome: a collapse of Perestroika -- both nationally and internationally -- and a resumption of political conflict and military confrontation.

I believe the answer is clearly Yes.

As nuclear arms agreements bring reductions in nuclear forces and add to crisis stability, there need never be a weakening of our nuclear deterrent. Concurrently with the changes in nuclear forces, it appears likely that, through both unilateral actions and bilateral agreements, the present numerical superiority and offensive capability of Warsaw Pact conventional forces will be reduced. In addition, there is a high probability that we can agree on Confidence Building Measures which will greatly reduce the danger to each side of surprise attack.

Together these actions should give the West high confidence that we can move down a path which provides hope for terminating the Cold War, without incurring unacceptable risks in the event we fail to achieve that objective.

## V. Conclusion

Earlier in this article, I pointed out that the Cold War between East and West -- a continuing series of political crisis, any one of which had the potential for escalating to military confrontation

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carrying the risk of destruction of our civilization -- has existed for over forty years.

It has led to huge defense expenditures -- over two trillion dollars by the US alone in the past eight years; it has turned our attention away from urgent domestic problems; and it has distorted relations among nations.

It is inconceivable to me that we should be content to continue on the present path of East-West confrontation for another 40 years. The risks of military conflict, with disastrous consequences, are unacceptably high and the dangers of erosion of public support for our present policies are increasingly great. We in the West do have an opportunity -- the greatest since the end of World War II -- to formulate and seek to establish a new relationship. We can do so from a position of strength. If our hopes are not realized we will have lost nothing. If we succeed, we can enter the 21st Century with a far more stable political relationship between East and West, and with a totally different military strategy: one of mutual security instead of war-fighting; with vastly smaller nuclear forces, no more than a few hundred weapons -- perhaps a few tens -- in place of fifty thousand; with conventional forces in balance and in defensive rather than offensive postures; and with a dramatically lower risk that our nation will be destroyed by unintended conflict.

With such a change in East-West relations, the long-term outlook for the United States will be brighter than at any time in this century.



As a nation, we are in the forefront of the technological revolution. We have the largest common market in the world -- a union of fifty states, in effect a union of fifty nations. We possess a flexible, skilled labor force (albeit one which requires large investments in continuing education and training); strong capital markets; adventuresome entrepreneurs; and stable political institutions. With these strengths, the US is uniquely situated to move into the twenty-first century as the strongest of the nations in a multi-polar world in which there will be a far lower risk of war between the great power blocs.

It is true, as Paul Kennedy says, in the twenty-first century the relative power of the US will be less. But no nation will have greater power. And in absolute terms, we can be far stronger than today: economically, politically and psychologically. There need then be no divergence, as there has been in recent years, between our ideals -- our belief in representative government, individual liberty, economic and social advance for all peoples -- and our international behavior. If the US and its allies are bold -- if together we dare break out of the mind sets of the past four decades -- we can help shape international institutions, as well as relations among nations, in ways which will lead to a far more peaceful world and a far more prosperous world for the peoples of both East and West and North and South.